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1. Introduction
The extraordinary growth of the Internet in the last few years, from fewer than 5 million
users in 1993 to 62 million in 1997 (Department of Commerce, 1998), has led some to speak of
the birth of a “world without borders,” where free communication, competitive markets, and
extensive comparison shopping are a matter of course (see The Economist, 1997a; Hof, 1998;
Pouliot, 1998).  This apparent lack of geography in cyberspace, however, has raised some difficult
issues regarding government policy toward the “new” economy, particularly regarding tax policy. 
The sales of products and services over the Internet have grown even faster than the
overall use of the Internet; data from Jupiter Communications suggests online sales have been
rising about 300% per year (Krantz, 1998) and are expected to continue growing at tremendous
rates.   Forrester Research predicts that, by the year 2000, total online sales will exceed $200
billion.  At the extreme, Nicholas Negroponte, founder of the MIT media laboratory has predicted
that such commerce may exceed $1 trillion by 2000.  Although online transactions currently make
up only a very small fraction of total retail sales, predictions such as these have caused state policy
makers to become highly concerned with the fact that most online transactions pay no sales tax.
1  
If these growth predictions are anywhere close to accurate, tax policy toward Internet commerce
promises to have serious consequences for future state tax policy since the sales tax makes up the
largest single component of state revenues. 
Economists have long argued that consumer sensitivity to tax rates will be larger for
people living along geographic borders or in an open economy, more generally, where the costs of
arbitraging tax rates across locations are low, and that this can have important implications for the
                                               
1 In general, Internet sales are treated the same as mail-order sales.  No sales tax is collected from companies that
have no presence (known as nexus) in the state.  Although sales tax is not collected, technically states apply a use
tax which requires consumers to pay the equivalent of the state sales tax on their mail-order and Internet
purchases.  The supreme court has ruled, however, that under existing law, an out-of-state vendor without nexus in
a state cannot be required to collect the use tax for that state even if the customer lives there (National Bellas Hess,
386 U.S. 753, 1967; Quill, 504 U.S. 298, 1992).  This has meant that use taxes have rather extreme compliance
problems and are little known by most consumers (see Trandel, 1992).  Enforcement of the use tax has only been
effective for goods like automobiles that must be registered in the state of use.3
setting of tax policy.
2  Empirical work on the responsiveness in border communities to taxes and
other such policies has tended to bear out these predictions by finding large elasticities in such
locations.
3 
Against this backdrop, then, perhaps the key issue that the Internet poses for tax policy is
not so much its potential to create a world without borders but rather to create a world of only
borders-a world in which everyone is as responsive to local taxation as people who live on
geographic borders.  With that perspective, it is clear why state lawmakers and some in the
popular press have decried “the disappearing taxpayer” and have called for reform (see The
Economist, 1997a; 1997b).  State Tax Notes has declared the issue of taxes and electronic
commerce “the hottest topic in multistate taxation” (Sheppard, 1998) and the National Governors
Association itself has called for a uniform tax on all Internet and mail-order sales.  They argue that
this would protect their revenue base and protect “Main Street” businesses.
4 
On the other hand, there is also serious opposition to taxes on the Internet.  The
opponents have argued that introducing taxes now might seriously impede the Internet’s growth
at a critical stage of early development (see, for example, Stephenson and Zeisser, 1998).  The
recent passage of the Internet Tax Freedom Act is certainly one manifestation of this view
although in its final form it does not prohibit uniform sales taxes.
5  Other opponents have argued
that compliance with the thousands of local tax rates,  or even monitoring those rates, would be
unduly burdensome on out-of-state companies, especially for sellers of information goods that are
delivered online and often do not even have a customer’s mailing address.
                                               
2 Such theoretical discussions can be found in Gordon (1983), Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Braid (1987), Kanbur
and Keen (1993), Trandel (1992; 1994) and Gordon and Neilsen (1997).
3   Empirical work on sales taxes and excise taxes in border areas can be found in Mikesell (1970), Fox (1986),
Walsh and Jones (1988), or Rappaport (1994). Holmes (1998) gives similar evidence on the effects of right-to-work
laws in border regions.
4  To actually impose such a tax, however, would currently violate the Interstate Commerce Clause of the
constitution and would require a specific federal law permitting states to require out-of-state companies without
nexus in a state, nevertheless, to collect use taxes for that state (see footnote 1).  Fox and Murray (1997) give a
good discussion of the issues.
5 The ITFA establishes a moratorium on new taxes but applying a sales tax to Internet sales would not be
considered a new tax so long as it applies to retail and out-of-state mail-order sales at the same time.4
Despite ongoing policy interest and despite the potential relevance to the broader field of
open economy tax policy, there has been little empirical work on the impact of tax policy on
Internet commerce.  Most economic work on the Internet has focused on more basic issues such
as pricing and access.
6  Existing discussions of taxes and Internet commerce have either centered
on legal and practical issues (see, for example, Horner and Owens, 1996; Bourgeois and
Blanchette, 1997) or else on the conceptual basis for Internet tax policy (Fox and Murray, 1997;
McLure, 1997).  Nor can we take lessons from previous research on mail-order sales which face
exactly the same issues.  There is virtually no empirical work on that subject, either.  Indeed past
work that has advocated administering taxes on out-of-state mail-order sales, has explicitly
assumed that there are no behavioral impacts (ACIR, 1986).
In this paper, I attempt to provide a rigorous empirical foundation for discussions of
Internet commerce by estimating how such commerce responds to local tax rates.  To do so, I
turn to a major recent survey of the online purchase patterns of approximately 25,000 people with
access to the Internet in more than 350 cities and metropolitan areas and match these data to the
tax rates in those communities.  The results show that Internet sales are highly sensitive to local
taxation.  This is true nationally, within regions, within states, and even within metropolitan areas.
 Controlling for individual characteristics, people who live in high sales tax locations are
significantly more likely to buy over the Internet and I can show that this is unlikely to result from
unobserved heterogeneity across locations.  The paper also uses data on computers to compare
the apparent tax responsiveness of both Internet and mail-order sales and finds similar effects for
both of the “non-taxed” channels.
The estimated tax elasticities of Internet commerce with respect to local taxation are quite
large and thus resemble the elasticities found in previous sales tax studies of geographical border
areas.  In policy terms, the results suggest that to apply existing sales taxes to Internet purchases
                                               
6  Examples of such work include Mackie-Mason and Varian (1995), Downes and Greenstein (1998), and the
papers in McKnight and Bailey (1995).5
would reduce the number of online buyers by 20-25% and spending by 25-30%.  The large
elasticities estimated here raise important questions about long-run tax policy toward Internet
commerce.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the data used in the paper and the
general approach.  Section III presents the basic evidence that taxes impact online buying
decisions and shows it to be highly robust.  Section IV examines the mail-order/Internet
distinction for the case of computer purchases.  Section V gives policy simulations of proposed
taxes on Internet commerce as well as some discussion of the longer-run role of sales taxes. 
Section VI concludes.
II. Data and Specification
A. Data
A major problem with doing empirical work on Internet commerce has been data. 
Aggregate data is not very useful.  Observing that Internet sales are high in places with high taxes
may just indicate that places with high taxes have higher incomes, higher computer ownership,
higher education, or any number of factors that are correlated with online buying.  Individual data
is extremely important but few consumer surveys even ask about the Internet and if they do, it is
hard to get sufficient sample sizes.  In any random sample of the population, less than half the
respondents are likely to have computers, of those, only a fraction have Internet access and only a
small share of those have ever bought something online.  To examine the response of such
purchases to local taxation then requires further dividing up the Internet shoppers by geographic
location.  It is easy to see why this will tend to yield small samples.
In this paper, I turn to an extensive private survey conducted in late 1997 for Forrester
Inc., a market research company in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  The survey was conducted by the
NPD group and is meant to provide a nationally representative portrait of the computer and
technology decisions of more than 110,000 consumers.  The survey includes detailed information6
about various demographic characteristics such as income, age, gender, education, as well as the
state and metropolitan area of residence.
7  The information covers the ownership of computers, as
well.  About 45% of the respondents had computers at the time of the survey.  Those owners
were then asked whether they had online access and if so, how often they used it and were asked
for their online buying history.  In total this yields a sample of about 25,000 online users, sixteen
percent of whom report having purchased something online.
For each individual that has bought something online, the survey asks how much they have
spent (in four groupings: $0-25, $25-100, $100-500, and $500+) for different types of goods such
as books, software, or computers.  I use the Forrester imputed values for each spending category
and sum across the types of goods to approximate the total amount spent online.  Using this
measure, the average amount spent, conditional on buying, is $322.  This is similar to existing
estimates of average online spending such as Krantz (1998).  Although the analysis will be done at
the individual level, for expositional purposes, figure 1 shows the share of Internet users that have
purchased something online in each state.  There is decided variation across locations. 
Matching the purchase data to local sales tax rates requires making some assumptions
because the data do not give the actual town name of the respondent.  Even if it did, there are as
many as 6400 different sales tax rates across the United States (see Rappaport, 1994) and
information on them is not kept by the federal government and must be collected at the state and
local level. 
I assume, first, that any one living in the primary state of the metropolitan area actually
lives in the primary city itself.  In other words, I assume that a person in the Chicago metropolitan
area who lives in Illinois lives in the city of Chicago.  This prevents me from distinguishing
between city and suburb within the same state, but is necessary given the nature of the data. 
Since, when they differ, the tax rates will almost always be lower in the suburbs, this error in
                                               
7 The metropolitan areas are actually defined as the television market the respondent lives in.  These are generally
larger than the corresponding SMSA.  San Francisco, for example, includes the entire bay area.7
measurement will tend to bias the estimated tax elasticities downward.
For practical purposes, I assume, next, that anyone living outside the primary state resides
in the physically closest county to the main city (measured using Rand McNally, 1997).  If that
state is one that applies both city and county rates, such as Oklahoma, I assume that they live in
the largest city in that closest county.
In total, this yields 351 different city-state locations.  The tax rates for most of these 351
locations were then compiled individually either from direct conversation with the department of
revenue in the state or from documents on the department’s website.  For states without
centralized information, I contacted a local chamber of commerce in the city or county.  Specific
local information was not necessary for some of the states since several have constant statewide
tax rates and four have no sales tax at all (Montana, New Hampshire, Delaware, and Oregon).  
The average sales tax rate in a state (weighted by population) is shown in figure 2.
Table 1 gives summary statistics of the sample of people with online access and then
divided according to whether or not they have ever purchased something online.  The two are not
very different in most measures although online buyers appear to be slightly better educated than
other online users, are somewhat more likely to be female, and so on.
B. Model and Specification
The idea of the paper is simple.  An individual choosing whether to buy a good at a store
versus online will compare the relative prices.  Assuming that he avoids paying use tax on the
online transaction and that local sales taxes do not affect local retail prices (i.e., elastic local







where the t is the sales tax, P is price and the subscript S indicates in a retail store and I indicates8
an online merchant.
 8  I will follow the common assumption in the literature on sales taxes across
regions and assume the relative price, P P S I / , is constant across regions.  Two comparisons of
Internet and retail prices (Goldman Sachs, 1997; Bailey, 1998) suggest that the ratio is close to 1
for many common products so I will assume that for the elasticity calculations.
I will use two related specifications for the individual’s choices about Internet commerce
each of which will include the tax rate and a number of economic and demographic controls such
as income, age, and education.  For the probability of having bought something online, I will use a
probit model.  For the amount that an individual reports having spent online, I will use a Tobit
model (censored because a large number of people report no spending).
3. Results
The initial results from estimating the probit regression of the {0,1} response of having
ever bought online (conditional on having Internet access) are presented in column 1 of table 2. 
The coefficients listed give the estimated marginal effects of the covariates on the probability of
buying online.  The mean probability of buying conditional on having online access is estimated to
be 20.3%.   The explanatory variables other than the sales tax term include income, education,
age, race, gender, marital status, and dummies for the presence of children under 18 in the
respondent’s household, whether the respondent operates their own business, uses a computer at
work, or owned a computer in the previous year.  The standard errors are corrected for the fact
that tax rates do not vary at the individual level but only by city and state.
The results show that the sales tax does appear to have a significant impact on the decision
to buy online and has the predicted sign.  The magnitude suggests that at the mean of the
covariates, raising the sales tax by .01 increases the probability of buying online by about .005. 
Since the mean probability of purchase is approximately .20, the estimated elasticity of online
                                               
8 The impact of local taxes on local prices has been examined by Poterba (1996) who finds no effect on pre-tax
prices and by Besley and Case (1998) who find that higher taxes actually raise pre-tax prices.9
buying with respect to the tax price (one plus the tax rate) is 2.3.  The other coefficients are
significant and have predictable signs.  Higher income, more education, and using a computer at
work make a person more likely to have bought online.  Being older, male, or married make a
person less likely.
Column 2, presents the Tobit version of the same specification where the dependent
variable is the amount the individual has spent online.  Again, there is evidence of a significant
effect of tax rates on Internet commerce.  At the mean, the elasticity of spending with respect to
one plus the tax rate is 3.6.
Both of these estimates may suffer from an obvious potential source of bias.  They show
that, controlling for observables, people who live in high sales tax locations tend to buy more over
the Internet.  It is clearly possible that places with high levels of “technological sophistication”
where people are disproportionately likely to have bought online may primarily be urban areas like
New York and San Francisco which also happen to have high sales tax rates, leading to a spurious
correlation.  In theory, the relationship could even be created by city level policies.  If a city raised
its sales tax in order to pay for Internet infrastructure to make online use easier, this would
certainly make high sales taxes look influential for online buying but for a different reason.  I will
attempt to deal with potential unobserved heterogeneity bias in a number of ways but it is
important to note that the bias need not go in this direction.  Other factors may bias the results in
the opposite way.  The results in table 1, for example, condition on having online access. If the
only people with online access in a technologically “backward” locations (that also tend to have
low tax rates) are the diehard Internet users who frequently buy, this will bias the coefficient
downward.
To deal with the unobserved city characteristics, I first present (columns 3 and 4) the same
probit and Tobit regressions but restrict the sample to include only the top 30 metropolitan areas
with the idea that these may be more comparable locations and will help eliminate any bias caused
from comparison to rural and small town locations.  This restriction reduces the sample by more10
than 40%.  The coefficients on the sales tax, however, are not significantly different than in the
full sample and the point estimates are larger.  They still show that taxes appear to have a
significant effect on Internet purchases.  The elasticities here are 2.9 on buying and 3.4 on
spending.  Obviously this does not rule out the spurious correlation, but does suggest that
whatever the correlation between technological sophistication and tax rates, it must be just as true
among the top 30 cities as it is between large metropolitan areas and more rural areas.
Next, in table 3, I use the variation in tax rates across geographic areas to further narrow
the comparison groups.  Column 1 and 2 include region dummies and asks whether individuals
with the same observable characteristics and living in the same region are more likely to buy
online in a city with a higher tax rate.  In both the probit and Tobit regressions, taxes have a
significant impact within regions.  The elasticities at the mean are 2.4 and 3.5.  Column 3 and 4
include state dummies and ask whether people with the same observables living in the same state
are more likely to buy online where the sales tax is higher.  Here the coefficients are particularly
large and significant suggesting that taxes matter within a given state.  The elasticities at the mean
are 8.4 and 11.7. 
More importantly, however, columns 5 and 6 then include dummies for the metropolitan
area itself and asks whether people with identical observables living in the same metropolitan area
but in different states (where sales taxes can differ) are more likely to buy online if their part of
town has higher tax rates.  Of the 207 metropolitan areas in the sample, 71 have people living
across state boundaries. New York, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C. are the most prominent
examples but there are many others.  The coefficient on local taxation in both specifications
remains large and significant.  The elasticities at the mean are 3.6 and 4.8 in the two equations. 
All of the results that follow will include these metropolitan area dummies to give the best
controls.
To show these within metropolitan area results more clearly, columns 7 and 8 look at such
city level variation in the most prominent metropolitan areas that cross state boundaries and have11
significant sales tax variation.  Of the top-30 greater metropolitan areas, there are four with 15%
or more of the population living outside the primary state and also have differences in sales tax
rates across the communities of more than half a percentage point. Those four are New York
(NY, CT, and NJ), Philadelphia (PA, NJ, and DE), Washington, D.C. (DC, VA, and MD), and
Boston (MA, NH, and VT).  The results show that people with the same observables living in the
metropolitan area but living in the part of town with higher taxes are significantly more likely to
buy over the Internet in these four cities.  The elasticities are even larger here than in the economy
wide specifications.  The elasticity of buying is more than 7 and the elasticity of spending is more
than 8. 
Taken together, the results in table 3 suggest that at any level of analysis, retail sales taxes
do matter for Internet commerce.  It may still be true, of course, that these results reflect a
correlation between taxes and unobserved variables.  These results suggest,  however, that such
correlation must be just as high or even higher within regions, states, and metropolitan areas.  In
other words, the correlation between unobserved technological sophistication or Internet
infrastructure and the sales tax rate within the New York City area (NY vs. CT, say) must be
greater than the correlation between New York City and Bowling Green, Kentucky which has the
same tax rate as CT.
In Table 4, I present further evidence on the subject of unobservables.  First, column 1
adds the top marginal income tax rate in the state to see if that appears to influence the online
buying probability.  There is little reason to expect that it should influence online buying.  If it
seems to matter and reduces the effect of the sales tax, this might cast doubt on the causal
interpretation of the sales tax coefficient.  The results show, however, that the sales tax coefficient
is unchanged (elasticity is still 3.9) and that there is no significant effect of income tax rates.
Next, each respondent with online access reports their frequency of going online.  If the
tax coefficient in the online purchase regressions arises from unobserved technological
sophistication or Internet infrastructure, controlling for online usage should tend to reduce or12
eliminate the tax coefficient on purchasing.  Column 2 shows that online use (in days per month)
does have a large, significant effect on the probability of buying online.  It does not, however,
reduce or eliminate the tax coefficient.  That coefficient remains large and significant with an
elasticity of buying of almost 4. 
On top of that, column 3 deals with the unobserved heterogeneity point directly by
examining the respondent’s online frequency of use as the dependent variable and asks whether
use is higher in locations where there are high taxes.  There is no reason to expect that high local
retail sales taxes should have an effect on the frequency of online use (as opposed to online
purchases).  Any positive relationship here would strongly suggest that tax rates are correlated
with technological sophistication, Internet infrastructure, or the like.  The results, however, show
no such effect.  The coefficient on taxes is insignificant and extremely small.  People in a city at
the lowest decile of sales tax (.04725) use the Internet approximately .003 days per month less
frequently than people in the top decile of sales tax (.08).  The mean frequency of use is 16.7 days
per month so the effect is really quite small.  Even if the coefficient were the highest value in the
95% confidence interval, the increase would still be less than half a day per month.  These results
suggest that people in high tax locations are no more likely to use the Internet, only to buy things
over the Internet (even controlling for how much they use the Internet).
Column 4 examines how many computers the respondent reports having ever owned. 
Again, if there is unobserved technological sophistication correlated with tax rates, people in
places with high rates will buy more over the Internet but are also likely to have owned more
computers over time than people in places with low rates.  The results show, however, that the
point estimate is very small, not significant and the sign is actually negative.  The average person
with online access has owned 1.97 computers in their lifetime.  Moving from the bottom decile of
tax rates to the top decile reduces the number of computers at the mean by .03.
Next, column 5 uses the respondents self evaluation from one to ten of the statement “I
like technology.”  This is an arbitrary ranking but, again, there is no evidence that people living in13
high tax locations like technology more than people in low tax locations.  The point estimate is
negative though small and insignificant. 
The evidence, then, is somewhat robust that Internet commerce is sensitive to local tax
rates and there is little evidence that the effect is spurious.  The elasticity of online purchases
when including the controls for metropolitan area are comfortably above 3 with the elasticity of
spending of almost 4.  Some specifications suggest even larger effects.  These elasticities are quite
close to similar elasticities estimated for the tax responsiveness of sales in border communities and
open economies in the research mentioned above.  The elasticities there are often close to 5 or 6. 
Implicit in the discussion has been the view that consumers are deciding between retail purchases
and Internet purchases.  If Internet purchases are instead coming out of mail-order sales, the
implications for policy making may be different.  Since mail-order faces no sales tax, however, it
is difficult to see why Internet sales would be higher in places with high sales taxes.  For one
particular good, however, I am able to consider the mail-order context simultaneously.
4. Retail, Mail-Order, and the Internet.
The treatment of Internet sales is, as stated previously, exactly the same as that of mail-
order companies so it is natural to wonder why states have expended so much effort recently to
allow the taxation of Internet commerce instead of devoting considerably more attention to the
currently much larger sales of mail-order.  According to the Census of Retail, mail-order company
sales amounted to $48.8 billion in 1997 and this is likely to be an under-estimate for reasons
described in ACIR (1986).  Such a number well exceeds the current size of Internet purchases. 
There are likely to be two reasons for this behavior.  The first is that, in some sense, the
battle over mail-order sales has already been lost.  The supreme court has ruled that states cannot
require out-of-state companies to collect use tax without congressional legislation permitting it. 
Major proposals to pass such legislation in the 1980s such as ACIR (1986) were defeated.  The
mail-order business is now well established and has a major lobby in its own right.  In this sense14
the Internet is more pressing precisely because it is not yet well established. 
A second reason the states may be less concerned with mail-order, however, is that the
growth of mail-order relative to retail sales has slowed considerably in recent years.  The mail-
order share of total retail sales, as reported in the Monthly Retail Sales, grew at an annual rate of
almost 9% from 1985 to 1992 (Bureau of the Census, various).  ACIR (1986) suggests that this
growth followed years of growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s of comparable annual rates. 
From 1992 to 1998, however, the growth rate has been only about 0.5% per year.  Mail-order’s
share of sales seems to have reached a plateau, lessening the urgency on the part of departments
of revenue around the country.  Certainly Internet sales will also slow down eventually but the
question is after how long?  With growth rates of 300% per year and the predictions of continued
massive growth, the Internet may easily become significantly more important that mail-order is
now.  That has made it a primary area of concern.
A key issue in this context is whether the tax sensitivity of Internet commerce is similar to
that of mail-order sales.  Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is no empirical work examining
this question.  This is likely due to a lack of data.  Using the Forrester data, however, I can relate
the tax sensitivities of mail-order and Internet sales for at least one product type.  In addition to
the online sales information used above, the Forrester data provide detailed information about
computer purchases (this is the data used in Goolsbee and Klenow, 1998) and this information
includes where computer owners bought their machines.  The choices include a variety of types of
retail establishments, “online,” and “direct from the manufacturer.”  In 1997, there were almost
40,000 computer owners in the sample.  I classify “direct from the manufacturer” as mail-order
though that may include some Internet purchases in recent years.  With this classification, 79% of
people bought their current computer in a store, about 19% through mail-order, and almost 2%
online.
Using these data, I ask whether, conditional on having a computer, individuals more likely
to have bought either online or through mail-order in places where there are high sales taxes. 15
This is, in a sense, a two-step decision where at the top level the individual decides whether to
buy a computer and next decides where to buy the computer.  To estimate this lower level
decision, I use a logit model where the dependent variable is zero if the computer was bought at a
retail store and one if it was bought online or through mail-order.  The explanatory variables are
the same as in the specifications above and they include the metropolitan area dummies.  The
results listed in column 1 of Table 5 show that the coefficient on local taxation is positive and
significant, suggesting that people with a computer and the same observables who live in the same
metropolitan area are more likely to have bought their computer in a retail store the lower is the
local tax rate.  The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that lowering the sales tax by .05 (an
exercise that will be of particular interest in the next section) would lower the probability of
buying “remotely” through mail-order or the Internet from .222 to .178, a decrease of almost
20%.
In columns 2a and 2b, I estimate a multinomial logit model that separates the mail-order
and Internet buyers. Here the baseline is buying from a retail store and the individual can choose
either mail-order or online purchase as an alternative.  I restrict the coefficients on the non-tax
terms to be the same for mail-order and for online sales to make the tax coefficients comparable
but the results were the same allowing the covariates to impact the choices differently.  Although
the number of Internet purchasers is much smaller and thus the standard error is larger, the
coefficients on mail-order and online purchases are both large and positive and they are not
significantly different.  The point estimates of the Internet are even larger than on mail-order.  At
existing tax rates, the mean probability of having bought in a store is .817, through mail-order is
.169, and online is .014.  Lowering the sales tax by .05 raises the retail probability to .858, lowers
the mail-order probability by more than 20% to .133 and the online probability more than 35% to
.009.  Although this is evidence only on one product, it does suggest that similar tax
considerations are at work with mail-order sales as they are with online sales and raises the issue
of whether applying taxes to the Internet would merely shift sales toward mail-order purchases.16
  
5. Policy Implications
A. Impacts of major proposals
At this point, given the estimates presented in the previous section, it is natural to ask
what would happen to Internet commerce if the United States were to start taxing it effectively
such as having the firms collect the tax.  The two most relevant existing policy proposals are the
proposal by the NGA to apply a consistent 5% rate to all Internet and mail-order sales and the
more general proposal to let each local area simply apply existing sales taxes to all Internet
commerce.
9  In general this latter policy implies a somewhat higher tax rate since the average tax
rate in the sample, when weighted by population, is 6.33%.
The results above use the sales tax on retail sales to explain Internet sales.  To calculate
the impact of applying sales taxes to the Internet is a slightly different question.  I have been
interpreting the tax sensitivity of online commerce as being caused by the price differential
between it and retail.  In that sense, applying a 5% tax to Internet sales is equivalent to reducing
the tax on retail sales by 5%.  All that matters is the relative tax treatment. 
Consider, then, the two proposals (applying a 5% rate and applying existing rates).  On
average, as would be expected given the large elasticities, applying a sales tax to Internet
commerce significantly reduces online commerce.  If a five percent tax rate were applied to online
sales (calculated here as reducing the retail sales tax by 5%), the number of online customers
would be 18% lower (using the specifications that include metropolitan area dummies) and total
sales 23% smaller.  The alternative proposal of applying existing tax rates to commerce would
eliminate even more Internet commerce.  It would reduce the number of buyers by 24% and
spending by 30%.  Responses in some of the specifications were even larger.
  Any such calculation is, necessarily, partial equilibrium in nature.  It is identified off of the
cross-sectional variation in tax rates which may not be the same as the effect generated by an
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aggregate shock to the tax rate in all locations.  An upward sloping supply curve of Internet firms
might lead to price changes, for example, which blunt the effects of tax changes on quantities (see
Goolsbee, 1998 for a discussion in the investment context).  That said, the results do suggest that
Internet commerce is particularly sensitive to local taxation.
Since the Internet is such a small part of existing retail sales, however, the results
document that the taxation of Internet commerce matters much more for the Internet commerce
than it does for tax revenue at the present time.  Even a 30% drop in Internet sales has a very
small impact on retail sales or total sales tax revenue in a state.  One result of that fact is that
protecting Internet commerce from taxation, for whatever reason, is unlikely to be very costly
though that will change if the Internet continues growing at current rates.
B. Long-run Policymaking
Even for current tax policy, however, the results pose a paradox for taxes and the Internet.
 From one perspective, there is clear evidence that a price differential is generating shifting across
distribution channels which will tend to generate a deadweight loss.  In the spirit of Cortlett and
Hague’s (1954) conclusion that we should tax substitutes similarly, eliminating the differential
taxation would seem to be welfare improving (see also the discussion in McLure, 1997).  This
point has certainly been made about mail-order sales (ACIR, 1986).
At the same time, however, the same large responses suggest that to apply taxes now
would reduce Internet commerce substantially and several arguments may weigh against doing so,
at least in the short run.
10  First, as the results on computers demonstrated, mail-order and
Internet sales appear to be equally responsive, at least for computers.  Given that out-of-state
mail-order sales are generally untaxed, it is important to find out whether Internet sales would
otherwise have been bought through the mail.  If they are, applying taxes to the Internet without
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commerce is the subject of ongoing research in Goolsbee and Zittrain (1998).18
applying taxes to mail-order will reduce consumer welfare without generating any revenue.  In the
case of computers and probably a number of other goods, this issue is clearly relevant and it
highlights the importance of not setting Internet tax policy unilaterally.
Second, there may be serious problems with enforcing a tax on Internet sales.  Even if
congress decides that states can require out-of-state vendors to collect use tax on sales, the
Internet will face a number of problems that mail-order companies do not.  Increasingly, for
example, Internet sales are information goods such as software that can be directly downloaded
with no mailing address.  In such a circumstance, calculating the relevant tax rate and enforcing it
may be expensive (see The Economist, 1997b).
Finally, there are some externality based stories that may support lower tax rates.  If there
are network externalities associated with the Internet or there are information uncertainties about
using credit cards online, an infant industry protection type argument might suggest a moratorium
on taxes until the Internet is better established.  The fact that the Internet is currently such a small
segment of retail sales means that the revenue cost of providing this protection in the short-run is
small.  Relatedly, even if maximizing revenue is the only goal of state governments, the existence
of network externalities in Internet commerce may suggest that taxes should be low or even
negative early on to increase the size of the Internet in the future.  Ron Wyden, a co-sponsor of
the Internet Tax Freedom Act, seems to have had an argument like this in mind when he explained
the need for federal action by saying “the crazy quilt of state and local taxes could do irreparable
harm to the Internet, killing the goose that could lay billions of dollars in golden eggs.” (Wyden,
1997).  In addition, work by Trandel (1992) suggests that having low tax rates in outlying
geographic areas can reduce the market power of city retailers and force down markups which
improves consumer welfare.  This same argument may be true for applying low tax rates for
Internet retailers.
5. Conclusion19
This paper presents an empirical analysis of how local taxation affects individual’s
decisions to buy things over the Internet.  Using an extensive data source of approximately 25,000
people with online access, this paper has shown that such taxes play an influential role in online
commerce.  Controlling for individual characteristics, people living in places with higher tax rates
are significantly more likely to buy things over the Internet.  This is true within regions, within
states, and even within cities.  The effect remains when controlling for individual use of the
Internet.  People living in high tax locations are no more likely to use the Internet, to have owned
several computers, or to like technology than people in low tax cities.  The relationship between
taxes and Internet sales is, therefore, unlikely to be caused by unobservable correlation between
tax rates and unobserved technological sophistication across locations.  Using data on computer
purchases, the data also suggest that the tax impact on Internet purchases may be somewhat
similar to the tax impact on mail-order sales.
The magnitudes on Internet sales are quite large and suggest that applying existing sales
taxes to the Internet might reduce the number of online buyers by 25% and online spending by
30% or more.  Since Internet sales currently make up such a small fraction of total retail sales,
however, the revenue loss from not applying such taxes is rather small so the cost of protecting
the Internet in the short-run is small.  If the growth rate of the Internet continues at current rates,
however, this could change.
In total, the results give empirical support to the idea that local taxes can play an
important role for individuals living in a “world without borders” and they motivate further
empirical work on the role of taxes in an open economy such as the Internet.20
Average Probability of Online Purchase
for Internet Users
0.23  to0.292   (8)
0.213  to0.23   (10)
0.196  to0.213   (11)
0.171  to0.196   (7)
0.117  to0.171   (12)
FIGURE 121
Average Sales Tax Rate
in Percent
6.9 to8.4  (12)
6.2 to6.9  (10)
6.1 to6.2   (1)
5.1 to6.1  (15)
0  to5.1  (10)
FIGURE 222
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS

























































































































































































































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  The method of estimation is listed at the top of each column.   The
dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is whether the individual reports having bought something online.  The
dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is the amount that the individual has spent online as defined in the text.
 The sample in the last two columns is restricted to people in the top 30 largest greater metropolitan areas in the
data.24
TABLE 3: RESULTS WITHIN REGIONS, STATES, AND METROPOLITAN AREAS

























































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  The method of estimation is listed at the top of each column.   The
dependent variable in columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) is whether the individual reports having bought something
online.  The dependent variable in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) is the amount that the individual has spent online
as defined in the text.  Each column includes dummy variables as indicated at the base of the column.  Columns (7)
and (8) restrict the sample to respondents in the New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington, D.C.,
areas.25






























































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  The method of estimation is listed at the top of each column. The
dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is whether the individual reports having bought something online.  The
dependent variable in column (3) is the frequency of going online in days per month.  The dependent variable in
column (4) is the number of computers the respondent reports ever having owned.  The dependent variable in
column (5) is the ranking from one to ten that the respondent gives to the statement “I like technology.”26



























Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  The sample in both regressions is restricted to computer owners.  Column
(1) estimates a logit model where the dependent variable is a zero if the individual bought their computer in a retail
store and one if they bought it either from mail-order or online.  Column (2a) and (2b) are from a multinomial
logit regression where the dependent variable is zero if the individual bought their computer in a store, one if they
bought through mail-order and 2 if they bought online.  The coefficients on the other variables are restricted to be
the same for the two alternatives to retail.27
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